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ABSTRACT. – This paper estimates the “production function” for scientiﬁc research publications in
the ﬁeld of biotechnology. It utilises an exceptionally rich and comprehensive data set pertaining to
the universe of research groups that applied to a 1989-1993 research programme in biotechnology and
bio-instrumentation, sponsored by the Italian National Research Council, CNR. A structural model of the
resource allocation process in scientiﬁc research guides the selection of instruments in the econometric
analysis, and controls for selectivity bias effects on estimates based on the performance of funded
research units. The average elasticity of research output with respect to the research budget is estimated
to be 0.6; but, for a small fraction of groups led by highly prestigious PIs this elasticity approaches 1.
These estimates imply, conditional on the distribution of observed productivity, that a more unequal
distribution of research funds would increase research output in the short-run. Past research publication
performance is found to have an important effect on expected levels of grant funding, and hence on
the unit’s current productivity in terms of (quality adjusted) publications. The results show that the
productivity of aggregate resource expenditures supporting scientiﬁc research is critically dependent on
the institutional mechanisms and criteria employed in the allocation of such resources.
R´ eputation et comp´ etences dans la recherche scientiﬁque publique :
´ Evaluation des effets sur la productivit´ e des ´ equipes de recherche
R´ ESUM´ E. – Cet article ´ evalue la « fonction de production » des publications de la recherche scientiﬁque
dans le domaine de la biotechnologie. L’article utilise un « data base » tr` es vaste et exceptionnellement
riche. Il concerne l’univers des ´ equipes de recherche qui ont fait une demande de programmes de
recherche de 1989 ` a 1993 en « biotechnologie et bio-instrumentation », ﬁnanc´ es par le Conseil National
de recherche (CNR) italien. Un mod` ele structural du processus de distribution des ressources pour la
recherche scientiﬁque guide la s´ election des instruments dans l’analyse ´ econom´ etrique et contrˆ ole par effet
de « selectivity bias » sur les ´ evaluations fond´ ees sur les « performances » des ´ equipes de recherche.
L’´ evaluation de l’´ elasticit´ e moyenne de r´ esultat (« output ») de la recherche a ´ et´ e 0,6, mais pour un petit
nombre d’´ equipes de recherche dirig´ ees par PIs prestigieux arrive ` a 1. Ces ´ evaluations impliquent qu’une
distribution unique des fonds pour la recherche augmenterait l’« output » de la recherche sur une courte
p´ eriode. Les publications pass´ ees ont un effet important sur les niveaux attendus de ﬁnancement obtenu
et, donc, sur la productivit´ e courante des ´ equipes de recherche en termes des publications (« quality
adjusted »). Les r´ esultats montrent que la productivit´ e des frais pour la recherche scientiﬁque, d´ epend
fortement de m´ ecanismes institutionnels.
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The complex and multi-dimensional links between technological progress
and scientiﬁc research have been recognised for a long time by economists as
well as by science administrators and business managers. (See, e.g., DAVID
[1993] for an overview.) Moreover, several recent quantitative studies have
shown that there is a signiﬁcant correlation between scientiﬁc research and
technical change in industry (NELSON [1986], JAFFE [1989], MANSFIELD
[1991], NARIN and OLIVASTRO [1992]).
Given this recognition, it is surprising how little attention economists have
paid to the determinants of the productivity in scientiﬁc research. We know
little about how increases in inputs affect the output of the research process,
or how shifting marginal research expenditures across research groups with
different characteristics would affect total research output. At a time when
public support for scientiﬁc research is being questioned, and national
research budgets are being subjected to retrenchment and restructuring in
many countries, empirically-grounded answers to these and related questions
are especially important for the sensible conduct of science policy.
Our approach to this problem is to develop a structural model of the
process by which research units apply for and receive funds, and estimate
the corresponding production function of scientiﬁc output, gauged in terms of
(journal quality-weighted) publications. In implementing this approach we
use an exceptionally complete and comprehensive data set from a pioneering
Italian research programme in “Biotechnology and Bio-instrumentation” that
was in effect during 1989-1993 under the auspices of the Centro Nazionale
delle Ricerche (CNR), the Italian equivalent of the U.S. National Science
Foundation (NSF).
We begin by discussing the general institutional context within which
public resource allocation for scientiﬁc research takes place, and the
implications for our modeling strategy. Section 3 describes the speciﬁc
features of the CNR biotechnology data set, and motivates the development
of the formal model in section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical estimates
of the parameters of the model. Section 6 examines how changing the
distribution of resources would affect the average productivity of research
budgets in the short run, taking the characteristics of the population of
research units as given. We also compute the estimated direct and indirect
effects of past performance, in order to assess the potential way in which
budget allocations affecting a unit’s publication rate would impinge upon the
reputational standing of its principal investigators (PI’s), and so affect their
expected future levels of public ﬁnding support from similarly organised
public programmes. Section 7 summarises the ﬁndings and concludes the
paper.
1642 The Institutional Context
2.1. The Institutions of Scientiﬁc Research
In this paper we must move beyond the view of science as the pursuit of
solitary researchers linked in “invisible colleges”. Research in the natural
and life sciences has become a collaborative enterprise, carried on by very
visible teams that are organised around increasingly expensive physical
facilities and instruments. Yet, even the recent careful econometric studies
by LEVIN and STEPHAN [1991], and STEPHAN and LEVIN [1992] continue
the traditional individualistic focus of sociologists and historians of science,
by investigating the life cycle productivity of individual academic scientists
in the U.S. Their research seeks to estimate the effects of ageing through
analysis of panel data, using ﬁxed effects type procedures to control for
unobserved differences. Such an approach could be justiﬁed as warranted by
the emphasis that American public research programmes have placed upon
grants to individual investigators, and the comparatively high degree of inter-
institutional mobility that characterises university researchers’ careers in the
U.S. Such a rationale is not uniformly appropriate across research areas,
however, and it is considerably less apposite when applied to the western
European institutional context. Moreover, although establishing individual
life cycle proﬁles in productivity allows one to assess the implications for
aggregate research productivity of changes in the demographic structure
of the scientiﬁc community, the immediate policy relevance of such
relationships is not so obvious. Policy options for manipulating the
demographic composition, essentially those affecting age-speciﬁc rates of
entry and exit from particular areas of scientiﬁc research, are likely to
involve indirect and lagged effects that are both costly and difﬁcult to
control. By contrast, policy instruments targeting resource allocation and
reward are likely to impinge more immediately on research productivity.
The mechanism for resource allocation in the world of open, academic
science is different from that of the private sector in which business
corporations set R&D budgets and manage the activities of employed
scientists; and the situation of the non-proﬁt research organization, whether
that of a free-standing institute or department or research unit within a
university, differs also from that of the individual scientist 1. Scientiﬁc
research groups obtain the bulk of their resources from public programmes in
which government agencies offer research grants and contracts to competing
applicants. Resources are allocated to selected groups according to the nature
of the programme objectives and the scientiﬁc reputation that the team or
of the unit has established in that area over an extended period of time–a
reputation that often is linked with the unit’s leadership by one or a few
senior scientists.
1. DAVID [1994], DASGUPTA and DAVID [1994] examine the efﬁciency implications of the
institutional structures and reward systems characterising academic science. See also DASGUPTA
and DAVID [1987].
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account by the funding agency (and possibly by the groups themselves), but
cannot be seen by the econometrician studying the outcomes, and if some
among those same characteristics also affect the production of observable
scientiﬁc results by the group, then the research budgets allocated to the
groups cannot be treated as an exogenous factor in the research production
function. The “endogeneity” of this input implies that, in the absence
of appropriate controls, there will be a bias in the estimated elasticity of
research outputs with respect to the associated budget allocations. Therefore,
in ﬁtting a cross-section “production function”, one needs a model of how
resources are allocated among the groups, in order to choose meaningful
econometric instruments and properly interpret the estimation results.
A model of the resource allocation process is also helpful in sorting out
the different ways in which past performance, by affecting the scientiﬁc
competence and professional reputation of the researchers associated with
a particular unit, will be related to future performance. In addition to a
direct competence-based effect, past performance may have two “indirect
effects” on research output. First, units with better past records are more
likely to be successful in getting research grants. Second, knowing this,
they will invest in applying for larger grants. Both effects imply higher
expected research budgets for these units, which (stochastically) raises their
publication output rates. The model presented in this paper enables us
to identify and separately estimate the direct and indirect effects of past
performance upon group productivity.
The indirect effects of past performance deserve attention because they
may underlie what has been referred to by ROBERT K. MERTON [1968],
as the “Matthew Effect in Science” 2. It is widely observed in studies
of scientiﬁc productivity that a small fraction of the individuals accounts
for the preponderant part of the body of published work (LOTKA [1926],
PRICE [1963, 1976] ALLISON et al. [1976]). While differences in talent
and ability may be part of the explanation for the pronounced left-skew
that characterises distributions of individual research productivities in many
speciﬁc ﬁelds of science, something further must be working to produce the
phenomenon (also observed) of temporally increasing skewness of such
distributions over the life of given cohorts of scientists. Institutional
resource allocation mechanisms that would tend to differentially channel
funding towards those who already have established a “track record” of
research successes, is a likely candidate for this role in creating a dynamic
“cumulative advantage” process. In other words, productive disparities also
reﬂect the outcome of stochastic processes that cumulate advantage by
2. By allusion to the passages of the New Testament according to St. Matthew: “For unto everyone
that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but... from him that hath not shall be
taken away even that which he hath”. (Matthew 13:12 and 25:39.) In his original formulation
of the Matthew Effect, Merton emphasised the disproportionately greater credit received for
their contributions by scientists who had obtained a measure of eminence, but in subsequent
work the original formulation was generalised by proposing that self-reinforcing processes
affected productivity as well as recognition in science. See DAVID [1994: pp. 77-80] for further
discussion.
166amplifying the effects of initial heterogeneities in the productivity-related
attributes of individuals, or research groups 3.
In this paper, we estimate a static model using cross-section data, and
therefore cannot directly identify how initial advantage may cumulate over
time. Nonetheless, a model such as ours would be a ﬁrst step towards
specifying the appropriate dynamic structure. In other areas of empirical
economies, researchers typically have collected and analyzed cross-section
data before proceeding to work with panel data, and we see our present
analysis as a similar ﬁrst step in the empirical research programme of the
“new economics of science”. But, more immediately, there are other issues
of intrinsic economic interest and potential policy relevance that can be
addressed directly through the analysis of cross-section data of the form
that we have at our disposal, such as the impact of increased funding on
research output in a given ﬁeld of scientiﬁc inquiry.
2.2. Biotech Research in Italy
Biotechnology and Bio-instrumentation (henceforth B&B) was the ﬁrst
major public research programme in biotechnology in Italy, and virtually
every Italian research group in molecular biology and genetic engineering,
more than 800 in all, applied to it. We have been able to obtain information
on the characteristics of both the units that were selected for funding, and
those that were rejected. Thus, not only can we relate inputs to scientiﬁc
output, but we can also correct for selection effects.
Unlike the US or UK, Italy is not considered a scientiﬁc powerhouse.
Between 1989-1991, US based scientists accounted for about 40% of the
publications in biomedical research, while Italian based scientists accounted
for a little over 2.7%. By comparison, the corresponding ﬁgures for
Germany, France and the UK are 6.2%, 5.2% and 7.8% respectively 4.
One may be tempted by this to suppose that a study of the Italian academic
research sector is therefore of limited value for understanding the economics
of modern scientiﬁc research in biotechnology, let alone as a basis for
broader generalisations. We believe such a view to be mistaken. For one
thing, certain structural features of national (and international) research
processes are preserved when scale changes. An instance of this, which we
will show below in greater detail, is that the distribution of publications for
Italian scientists looks no different from that observed in other countries–it
is highly skewed, with a small fraction of the researchers accounting for
a large fraction of the total publications generated by the population as
a whole 5.
3. ALLISON et al. [1982] surveys the sociological literature in cumulative advantage processes.
For economists’ view on this subject, see the discussions in DAVID [1994], STEPHAN [1996], and
ARORA and GAMBARDELLA [1997].
4. See The European Report on Science & Technology Indicators [1994].
5. See ﬁgure 2b below. Recall that our sample is close to the relevant universe. The equivalent
sample for the US would not be simply the leading research labs but any research lab working
in molecular biology or genetic engineering in the country.
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conveys at least one signiﬁcant advantage for the purposes of this study. It
allows us to neglect the constraint on aggregate output that arises from the
ﬁxed number of scientiﬁc journals. Put differently, since US scientists author
a large fraction of the publications in international journals, their aggregate
publication output is constrained by the growth rate of the number of
existing journals.
Estimates of the marginal product of research inputs based on US data
may be subject to a downward bias on this account. This problem is much
less severe in the case of Italy.
Another source of potential doubts about the value of relying upon
empirical ﬁndings about the scientiﬁc research process based upon the
Italian CNR experience is the casual supposition that non-scientiﬁc, political
considerations may intrude into the details of the funding agency’s decision
process to a degree that is not present in the peer review processes through
which resources are allocated in, say, Britain or the US. We believe that
in the particular CNR programme we have studied here such a suspicion is
unwarranted, and the processing of proposals for funding was conducted in
a way that conformed with the norms of scientiﬁc peer review. Moreover,
our measures of scientiﬁc “output” are publications weighted by the quality
of the publishing journal, using the so-called “impact factors” of journals
based upon the computations of the Science Citation Index. Hence, the
productivity of the Italian biotechnology research units is being evaluated
by the same standards that are used to measure the publication outputs of any
other international scientiﬁc community 6. Furthermore, this is not a matter
that is left for conjecture; we shall explicitly model the selection process,
as well as the setting of the research budgets that the selected units receive,
and thereby allow the data themselves to reveal the extent to which the
programme from which the data used here have been drawn was broadly
conformable with our priors based on information about corresponding
institutional arrangments and procedures in the Anglo-Saxon world.
3 Data Description
3.1. Variables Used in the Analysis
B&B is a ﬁve-year programme (1989-1993) for research in molecular
biology and genetic engineering issued by the Italian CNR in 1987.
The programme was divided into seven sub-programmes. The ﬁrst six
6. We may point out again that the small relative size of the Italian research community is a
virtue in this respect, since their proportionate contributions to the aggregate citations of journal
article, like their proportionate contributions to the international journals’ contents, are so small
that they cannot be thought capable of inﬂuencing the relative impact factors of those journals.
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genetic engineering. Sub-Programme 7, Bio-Instrumentation, focused on
development and experimentation of scientiﬁc instrument prototypes. A
total of 858 research laboratories applied to B&B, with universities and
CNR in-house laboratories accounting for about 62% and 15% respectively.
The rest of the applications were from other non-proﬁt research institutions
such as foundations and hospital research labs, as well as some commercial
ﬁrms. The research groups that applied to the programme are well-deﬁned
units of scientiﬁc production. They are teams of scientists, researchers,
technicians and other personnel within established institutions, which are
stable over time. They were not formed to carry out just this project. Of
the original 858 units, CNR selected 360 for funding. Due to missing data,
our ﬁnal sample is composed of 797 units, of which 347 were selected
for funding.
Table 1 deﬁnes all the variables used in our empirical analysis. We
collected most of our data from the application forms. B&B had an explicit
goal of encouraging industrial “transferability” of research. Applicants had
to indicate whether the project had potential industrial uses, and if so, who
the potential users were. We summarised this information in a dummy
variable, TRANSF, which takes the value 1 if the applicant declared that his
project had potential practical uses, and indicated the name of one or more
ﬁrms that could use those results. These are projects that signal concrete
opportunities of application as the units were able to indicate precise names
of industry users. CNR programmes typically have as one of their policy
objectives the encouragement of research in the less advanced regions of
the country, and particularly in the “Mezzogiorno” or the southern part of
Italy. The dummy variable, DSOUTH, takes the value 1 for units located
in the “Mezzogiorno”. The variable, DPRO7, is a dummy variable for
bio-instrumentation related proposals. We also created dummies DCNR and
DUNI for CNR and university labs. Other characteristics of the units are:
TABLE 1
Deﬁnition of Variables Used in the Analysis.
I Index for selection–dummy equal to 1 if the unit was granted a positive budget
A Total 1989-1991 budget asked by the units (in millions Italian Lire)
G Total 1989-1991 budget granted (in millions Lire)
PUB Quality-adjusted number of publications of the units that acknowledged
contribution of this Programme
DPRO7 Dummy for units in sub-Programme 7 (Bio-Instrumentation)
DCNR Dummy for CNR laboratories
DUNI Dummy for university laboratories
DSOUTH Dummy for units located in the South
TRANSF Dummy for industrial "transferability" of the project
SIZE Size of the group (number of people)
K Quality-adjusted 1983-1987 publications of the PI listed in the application form
COLLAB Number of research collaborations with foreign non-proﬁt institutions listed in
the application form
NUIST Number of units from the same institution of the applicant that applied to the
programme (e.g. University of Rome, CNR of Naples)
PROV_POP Total 1987 population in the province of the unit (thousands)
AGEPI Age of the PI (years)
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and technicians in the unit; AGEPI, the age of the PI, NUIST, the number of
units from the same institution (e.g. University of Rome, CNR of Naples)
that applied to the programme; and PROV_POP, the population of the
province wherein the unit is located.
CNR supplied us with the list of units that were selected, and the total
budget granted to each in each of the ﬁve years of the programme. From the
CNR we also obtained data on the total number of publications produced
by the selected units. These are all the publications available in 1994
that explicitly acknowledged the ﬁnancial support of this programme. As
B&B actually ended in late 1994, the CNR warned us that some of its
results were yet to be published, and these publications referred mostly to
activities conducted in the ﬁrst three years of the programme (1989-1991).
Accordingly, we deﬁne our budget requested and budget granted variables
as the amounts pertaining to the ﬁrst three years of the programme. Since
annual budgets tended to be constant over time, this involved little more
than simply scaling the variables by three ﬁfths.
To weight publications so as to measure output in comparable units
of “quality”, we employ the 1987 impact factor (as computed by the
Science Citation Index, SCI) for the respective journals in which the units’
publications appeared 7. Using the number of citations to the papers is
an alternative way to weight for quality. However, because the papers
produced in the programme were all relatively recent at the time of data
collection, citation measures were likely to be biased. Instead, we deﬁne
, where is the number of publications of the -th
unit in the -th journal, and is a linear function of the impact factor of
the -th journal. We experimented with a variety of speciﬁcations for .
Here we report results using 8.
As a measure of past performance of the group, we used the 1983-1987
publications of the PI listed in the application form 9. These were
adjusted for quality in the same way as the publication output. Even though
these publications are “older”, and the citations are therefore more complete,
we have chosen to be consistent with the quality measure used for the units’
publication output 10. We used the research collaborations (COLLAB) of the
unit with foreign non-proﬁt institutions as another measure of quality. One
can think of the past publications of the PI as a measure of the quality of
7. The IF is the ratio between the number of citations of the journal by other journals, and its
number of citations to other journals. A high value of the thus indicates a journal that
is cited more frequently than it cites. In our data, for journals ranged from close to 0 to
about 15. Nature for instance had a 1987 of 14.77. Articles in books and working papers
have a nominal of 0.
8. We experimented with ij as a weight, as well as simply ij. These correspond to
giving a high weight to working papers and journal articles to giving no weight to these. After
some casual search, we settled on the speciﬁcation noted above. In all cases, the results were
substantially unchanged.
9. Along with other information, the units had to list all relevant publications (to this programme
or in related areas) of the PI and of other members of the unit in the previous ﬁve years
(1983-1987).
10. Note that the research output is of the entire research unit, rather than just the PI.
170the unit, while COLLAB measures the quality of the project, although the
two overlap. As with other self reported variables, we assume that research
collaborations are exogenously given, at least in the short run.
3.2. Correlations & Reduced Form Regressions
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for out data. Figures 1 and 2 show
the distributions of budget asked , budget granted , publication
output (PUB), and past publications of the PI ( ). All four distributions are
skewed, especially the two distributions of publications. The log-normal
distribution appears to be a good approximation to these distributions, and
is the one speciﬁed in our structural model.
Tables 3 and 4 show reduced form regressions of , and PUB, for
all 797 units as well as for the 347 units that were selected for funding. We
also present the publication equations with and without the budget among
the regressors. Table 3 shows that both expected budget asked and budget
granted are positively related to transferability, past publications, foreign
collaborations and the size of the unit. However, while budget asked by
research units from the South was 116 million Lire more than the average,
the expected budget given to them conditional on selection is actually lower
than the corresponding average. As we show below, this behaviour can be
motivated by a higher than average probability of selection, as well as a
lower per unit effort cost of preparing larger research proposals.
As Table 4 shows, past publications has a large impact on publication
output even after we add budget granted amongst the regressors. Together
with the results from Table 3, this suggests and past performance may have
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics (797 observations).
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
I 0.435 0.496 0 1
A (*) 350.244 275.743 25 4224
G (*) (+) 105.035 62.147 3 519
PUB (+) 17.468 22.442 0 199.19
(non quality-adj. number) (6.761) (6.065) (0) (50)
DPRO7 0.107 0.309 0 1
DCNR 0.154 0.361 0 1
DUNI 0.645 0.479 0 1
DSOUTH 0.189 0.392 0 1
TRANSF 0.375 0.484 0 1
PROV_POP (§) 195.260 126.290 100 3477
COLLAB 4.018 3.323 0 25
31.672 43.556 0 636.79
(non quality-adj. number) (13.065) (17.020) (0) (226)
SIZE 12.055 6.221 2 99
NUIST 25.152 18.377 1 63
AGEPI 52.287 8.490 34 85
(*) Millions Italian Lire; (+) 347 observations for ; (§) thousands.
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Budget asked, Budget granted.
(Frequency distributions, 797 observations).
a) Budget Asked – BA.
b) Budget Granted – BG.
172FIGURE 2
Publication Output, Past Publications
(Frequency distributions, 797 observations).
a) Publication Output–PUB.
b) Past Publications–K.
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OLS Estimates: (Budget asked, Budget granted).
A A G G
Const 3.497 3.691 –3.294 3.742
(0.530) (0.722) (2.009) (0.782)
DPRO7 0.165 0.141 0.577 0.413
(0.079) (0.106) (0.253) (0.121)
DCNR –0.060 0.033 0.763 0.244
(0.067) (0.093) (0.257) (0.111)
DUNI –0.038 0.045 0.380 0.050
(0.057) (0.092) (0.212) (0.115)
DSOUTH 0.274 0.231 0.100 –0.127
(0.051) (0.077) (0.185) (0.078)
TRANSF 0.122 0.109 0.587 0.095
(0.040) (0.054) (0.159) (0.061)
ln(SIZE) 0.547 0.543 0.426 0.177
(0.059) (0.093) (0.167) (0.074)
ln(K) 0.065 0.105 0.646 0.092
(0.021) (0.027) (0.077) (0.033)
ln(COLLAB) 0.102 0.118 0.359 0.042
(0.030) (0.039) (0.123) (0.043)
ln(NUIST) –0.066 0.006 –0.074 –0.017
(0.026) (0.037) (0.086) (0.042)
ln(PROV_POP) 0.041 –0.001 0.294 0.031
(0.027) (0.039) (0.096) (0.046)
ln(AGEPI) 0.101 0.037 –0.130 –0.089
(0.129) (0.160) (0.461) (0.199)
No of obs 797 347 797 347
Adj. 2 0.242 0.308 0.174 0.089
Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parenthesis.
a direct and an indirect effect on publication output. The impact of budget
given varies considerably between the full sample and the restricted sample.
This problem arises because both, selection and the amount of funding, are
potentially correlated with unobserved variables that also affect output. The
structural model set out in the following section attempts to address both
issues: selection and endogeneity of budget.
4 The Model and the Estimated
Equations
4.1. Two Caveats
• Knowledge vs. reputation capital: As remarkable as the available
data set is, it does not permit us to distinguish empirically between a
174TABLE 4
OLS Estimates: PUB (Publication Output).
A A G G
Const –1.688 3.302 –0.128 2.239
(1.194) (1.577) (0.733) (1.591)
G (*) – – 0.474 0.284
(0.014) (0.100)
DPRO7 –0.108 –0.720 –0.382 –0.837
(0.117) (0.196) (0.091) (0.194)
DCNR 0.193 –0.019 –0.168 –0.089
(0.155) (0.179) (0.095) (0.177)
DUNI 0.149 –0.041 –0.031 –0.055
(0.140) (0.179) (0.079) (0.174)
DSOUTH –0.178 –0.570 –0.225 –0.534
(0.110) (0.160) (0.080) (0.160)
TRANSF 0.184 –0.106 –0.094 –0.133
(0.096) (0.114) (0.062) (0.113)
ln(SIZE) 0.163 0.105 –0.039 0.054
(0.099) (0.132) (0.071) (0.132)
ln(K) 0.498 0.435 0.192 0.409
(0.052) (0.065) (0.035) (0.065)
ln(COLLAB) 0.270 0.220 0.100 0.208
(0.165) (0.078) (0.044) (0.077)
ln(NUIST) –0.091 –0.003 –0.055 0.002
(0.049) (0.062) (0.033) (0.061)
ln(PROV_POP) 0.156 –0.075 0.017 –0.084
(0.056) (0.079) (0.035) (0.077)
ln(AGEPI) –0.086 –0.519 –0.024 –0.493
(0.273) (0.365) (0.167) (0.356)
No of obs 797 347 797 347
Adj. 2 0.202 0.239 0.683 0.256
Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parenthesis. (*) For , G set equal to 0.
measure of researchers’ knowledge capital or “competence”, and a measure
of their scientiﬁc “reputation” capital. Past performance may be related
to future performance both because the two reﬂect some inherent (ﬁxed)
attribute of the researchers that affects their productivity, and because
superior performance enhances reputation, and thereby results in access to
more generous funding. This open up the possibility that past performance
may reﬂect not just inherent differences among researchers’ capabilities, but
also small idiosyncratic factors of personality, or extraneous circumstances
unrelated to talent but nonetheless affecting early funding success. When
initial success is rewarded with greater funding, then this increases the
likelihood of future success as well. If funding agencies estimate future
productivity based on past publication performance without taking into
account past levels of funding, this gives rise to state dependence in the
production process. Were one to allow for learning effects, gained through
the experience of carrying out funded projects, the state dependent nature of
REPUTATION AND COMPETENCE IN PUBLICLY FUNDED SCIENCE 175the process would become even more marked 11. Using cross-section data, as
we do, one cannot separate state dependence from unobserved heterogeneity.
What we seek to do in this paper is to separate the direct effects from the
indirect effects of “knowledge capital” on the likelihood of units receiving
funding–a reﬂection of the working of the external institutional mechanisms
rather than the internal production capabilities of the group.
• Marginal vs. total inputs and outputs. In a given year, a unit
may choose to work on more than one project. Unfortunately, we do not
observe the inputs (funding) received by the units for other projects. This
is potentially a source of bias if the projects are inter-dependent in either
inputs or output. The intuition is straight forward. Suppose each unit can
work on two projects. One of these is the CNR project and the other is
an alternative project (possibly less attractive). The productivity, per unit
of research effort, in the latter may fall if the research unit also works on
the CNR project. This implies that merely looking at the inputs and output
of the CNR project alone would lead to an over-estimate of the marginal
product of research effort. Similarly, the selected units may indicate as an
ouptut of the programme publications supported by other funds, leading to
“double counting” and an over-estimate. Conversely, if there are positive
spillovers across projects, one will end up with an under-estimate.
Since we do not observe the funding for any of the unit’s projects other
than the one studied here, we will formally assume that the CNR project is
independent of its other activities. As a practical matter, this is a reasonable
approximation. The average funding for selected project in our sample is
105 million Lire over a period of three years, which is equal to about
$65,000 (see Table 2). We do not have a ﬁrm benchmark to compare but
this clearly is a small enough number to imply that this particular CNR
programme was not intended as the major funding source for most of the
units. Similarly, based on data from the Science Citation Index (provided to
us by the ISI), we estimate that the average PI among the selected units in
our sample produced about 4.7 publications (unweighted) per year in the ﬁve
year period prior to the programme 12. By comparison, for this programme,
the annual publication output for an entire research unit was only 1.3 during
1989-1991. Note also that during this time interval, total publications in the
area of bio-medical were growing at over 2% per annum, implying that the
programme-related publication output of the unit as a whole is less than a
fourth of the publication output credited to the typical PI.
Moreover, in the foregoing, the precise meaning of ‘independent’ should
be understood as applying to the “direct cost” aspects of the CNR project.
What we assume here is that research outputs that have been directly
ﬁnanced from other sources are not attributed by the unit to its project in
the CNR’s B&B programme; and, likewise, that funds obtained from the
latter programme are not diverted to support research and publications that
11. Indeed, if either or both sources of positive feedback are sufﬁciently strong, the microlevel
dynamics of the stochastic process governing publication output and reputational status will
become non-ergodic and path dependent. See DAVID [1994: pp. 80-84] for further discussion.
12. The PIs of the selected units produced 8197 publications during the period 1983-1987. The
total publication from the programme between 1989-1991 was 1367.
176fall outside that programme’s (and hence would not be reported among the
CNR project outputs). Our assumptions here recognise the possibility that
there are elements of “joint-production” in the research unit’s operations.
The latter are, indeed, quite likely in the case of the larger units which hold
a number of grants and/or contracts; the costs of indivisible elements of the
“infrastructure” (both staff and facilities) may be met through a policy of
levying what are in effect “internal overhead” charges on all concurrently
running projects in the unit.
4.2. The Model
Our objective here is to derive three equations that can be estimated. The
ﬁrst two are the equations for budget requested and budget granted. The
third equation is the production function of publication output.
• Research Units. We assume that the research units maximise their
expected research output. They have two choice variables–the size of the
project, which we measure by the budget asked, and the amount of research
effort (unobserved by us), also reckoned in monetary units. We assume that
increasing the size of the project is costly, and these costs are borne by
the research unit. Furthermore, actual research effort will differ from the
ex ante research effort because the units cannot fully predict their actual
research budget. In a fully speciﬁed model, the units would have to satisfy
an inter-temporal budget constraint. Since we only have a cross-section, and
since it is possible that units may have other sources of research support,
we specify in (3) and (3a) below an ad hoc rule linking expected budgets,
and the ex ante and actual research effort. By substituting in this rule, the
unit’s decision problem effectively reduces to the choosing the optimal size
of the research project, .
• CNR Decision Making Process. The CNR is assumed to follow a
two-step decision procedure. The ﬁrst is a dichotomous decision, whereby
projects are either selected for funding, or rejected. In the next step, the
actual funding levels for the projects selected in the ﬁrst step is decided. We
assume that the budget requested for the project is not included as a criterion
in the ﬁrst step. Although we have chosen this representation for modeling
convenience, we believe that this is a fairly accurate representation of the
actual decision making procedures followed by public research agencies.
Although excluding the budget requested from the ﬁrst step may appear to
be a very strong restriction because projects with very large (or very small)
budget requests may be deselected at the ﬁrst stage, in practice there is
informal communication between agencies like the CNR and the research
units. In this way, otherwise worthy projects may be modiﬁed to ﬁt into any
budget criterion that the agency may have implicitly imposed. Note that if
this informal (and unobserved) communication takes place, the situation is
difﬁcult to distinguish empirically from one where no budget criterion exists.
In a fully speciﬁed model, one would also derive the CNR’s decision
rule as an optimal response to the decision rules followed by the units.
That, however, would entail the introduction of a great deal more structure,
which presently we lack the necessary data to identify econometrically.
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still more extensive data set.
Figure 3 shows the sequence of actions from the launch of the programme
to production of publications. When the programme is started, the agency
sets a rule for selecting projects and for allocating budgets. This amounts to
deﬁning the two-step procedure characterised by (1) and (2) below. Given
these rules, each unit chooses the optimal size of the research project so as
to maximise its utility. The CNR then selects from amongst the projects,
FIGURE 3
178and allocates budget. These decisions depend in part upon characteristics
of the unit and project observed only by the CNR ( and ), in part upon
characteristics observed by the CNR and the research unit ( ), and in part
upon publicly observed characteristics of the unit and the project, denoted
by . While we assume that is distributed independently of ,w e
allow for to be correlated with . Units observe the actual budget, and
adjust their planned research effort according to (3). Finally, is realized,
and publication output is determined according to (4). We allow to be
correlated with , as well as with .
4.3. Notation
Let:
research effort of unit
“planned” research effort
budget granted by the agency
budget requested by units
latent selection variable
index with
other characteristics of unit and project
application and set-up costs of a project of size A
publication output
past publication output
other characteristics of the units that inﬂuence the production of
publications
We also deﬁne the following expressions.
• Selection equation
(1)
where . Deﬁne to be the standard normal and the
standard cumulative normal such that .
• Budget granted equation
(2)
where is a measure of quality, observed by the units and
the CNR and not by the econometrician. The other term, ,i s
independent of and , and represents the uncertainty, from the viewpoint
of the research unit, in the actual budget granted. It captures any unobserved
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of the research units 13.
• Research effort
(3)
where is “planned” research, deﬁned as
(3a)
Note that this implies that research effort is not simply proportional to
the allocated budget. Instead, the relationship between research effort and
the budget depends, indirectly, also upon the costs, and other characteristics
of the research unit.
• Production Function of Publications
(4)
where accounts for stochastic factors in the production of
publications. Note that we allow , the elasticity of output with respect to
research effort, to vary with quality of the unit.
• Cost equation
(5)
4.4. Optimal Project Size
We assume that units choose to
Notice that
. Since does not affect selection,
and are also independent of . Thus the
problem of the units boils down to
The ﬁrst order condition of this problem yields
(6)
13. We use the conventon that ’s denote errors whose expected value depends upon , and ’s
errors whose expected value does not depend on .
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We now derive our three equations to be estimated for selected units 14.
To derive the budget requested and budget granted equations, substitute for
from (6) in the expression (2) for , conditional on . This gives
(7)
(8)
where is the covariance between and , and 15.
Combining this with (3), (3a), and (6), we can write
(9)
where is the covariance between and , , and
, where stands for the ﬁrst
four terms of equation (8).
Equation (9) is the production function of publications that we estimate.
Note that our model enabled us to transform the production function deﬁned
by equation (4), which depended on the unobserved research effort of the
units, into an expression that depends on a variable , the expected budget
conditional on selection and a parameter which can be retrieved from
the estimated parameters of equations (7) and (8). In addition, equation (9)
enables us to estimate the elasticity with respect to the budget (or research
effort) after specifying a functional form for .
5 Estimation and Results
5.1. Estimation Strategy, Regressors, and Identiﬁca-
tion
We ﬁrst estimate the selection equation (1) as a probit, using all
observations. This produces estimates of and evaluated at , where
14. This procedure implies that information from the non funded units is only used to estimate the
selection equation.
15. Note that by accounting for the covariance between I and k, we are following what amounts
to the standard Heckman-Mills procedure for correcting sample selection. In our case, selection
correction has to be done in the budget equations as well as the publication equations.
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observations after substituting the estimated and . This two-step,
Heckman-Mills correction procedure was chosen because it is convenient
and robust. Using conventional terms, selection correction has to be applied
both in the budget equations, as well as in the publication equation.
We next estimate (7) and (8) jointly by GLS. We use the estimated
values of , and to compute which we substitute
in (9), and estimate (9) as a Tobit using a variety of speciﬁcations for
16. Since the data are distributed as log-normal, we use the log-log
speciﬁcation throughout 17. We also estimated speciﬁcations in levels but
the ﬁt to the data was poorer, although the point estimates of elasticities
were remarkably similar to those reported here.
• Regressors. As discussed earlier, we use all exogenous variables (vector
below) except size and budget asked to predict selection. We also
exclude DPRO7 because CNR did not commit ex ante to select given
percentages of applicants from each sub-programme, but examined the
projects altogether and selected them according to characteristics such as
quality, and transferability. We impose this restriction primarily to preserve
degrees of freedom; it is not critical for identiﬁcation and a formal test of
the restriction implies that the restriction is not rejected.
Recall that the variables in affect the cost of preparing a project of
“size” ; the variables in account for factors that affect the fraction of
granted; the vector accounts for exogenous variables that affect the
productivity of publications. We used the following speciﬁcation for ,
and (corresponding , and parameters in parenthesis):
Z-regressors X-regressors H-regressors
• const ( ) • const ( ) • const ( )
• DPRO7 ( ) • DPRO7 ( ) • DPRO7 ( )
• DCNR ( ) • DCNR ( ) • DSOUTH ( )
• DUNI ( ) • DUNI ( ) • TRANSF ( )
• DSOUTH ( ) • DSOUTH ( ) • ln(N) ( )
• TRANSF ( ) • TRANSF ( ) • ln(K) ( )
• ln(K) ( ) • ln(K) ( ) • ln(RCF) ( )
• ln(RCF) ( ) • ln(RCF) ( ) • ln(NUIST) ( )
• ln(NUIST) ( ) • ln(NUIST) ( ) • ln(PROV_POP) ( )
• ln(PROV_POP) ( ) • ln(PROV_POP) ( ) • ln(AGEPI) ( )
• ln(AGEPI) ( ) • ln (AGEPI) ( )
• ln(SIZE) ( )
The Z- and X-regressors include all the variables used for selection.
Unlike and include DPRO7. Bio-instrumentation projects are more
costly to prepare. To present a “credible” proposal in this area, units have
to show that they will be able to utilize expensive equipment or facilities
16. We estimate (9) separately by Tobit because more than 10% of the selected units produced
zero publications.
17. For variable that take on a value of zero, we added one to that variable when taking logs.
182to carry out development and testing activities. Thus, the organization of
the proposal may require, to a greater extent than projects in the other more
“scientiﬁc” sub-programs, time and resource consuming steps like arranging
for the use of such equipment or even for their rental or purchase. Finally,
we included the size of the team in . Larger teams can write larger
grants because of greater specialisation amongst its members, or because
SIZE proxies for other resources available to the group. We assume that
conditional on the budget asked and other covariates, SIZE does not affect
the fraction of the budget granted. In the production function of publications
(vector ) we include all exogenous variables except DCNR and DUNI.
We also include DSOUTH in to account for any disadvantages that units
in Southern Italy may face.
• Identiﬁcation. Note that we identify our parameters through some key
exclusion restrictions. First, we exclude the budget asked and the size of
the unit from the selection equation. As discussed above, the exclusion of
budget asked is justiﬁed if there is informal communication between the
units and CNR prior to the formal application process. The exclusion of
the size of the unit is also a plausible restriction because given budgets and
other characteristics of the units, size does not affect output. Therefore, it
is rational for the CNR not to consider size in selection 18.
Second, we assume that the size of the team does not affect the fraction
of budget granted. This is a plausible restriction, inasmuch as the fraction of
the budget granted is hypothesised to depend upon measures of quality and
transferability. Third, we identify the elasticity with respect to the budget in
the publication equation by assuming that differences in institutional types,
DCNR and DUNI do not directly inﬂuence the productivity of publications,
whereas they do inﬂuence the fraction of budget granted. University based
units and CNR units may face greater costs of writing large grants because
they are subject to a variety of constraints on hiring of temporary personnel.
These units also are more likely to obtain larger fractions of budget asked.
Typically there are formal and informal relationships between a public
funding agency like CNR and other public research institutions. This
implies that CNR is better informed about the activities and reputation of
these groups and their projects. Such groups may, of course, have been
in a better position to “lobby” for their projects. Once other factors are
controlled for, however, there is no obvious reason why the productivity of
research groups should differ according to institutional type. A likelihood
ratio test implies that the restriction cannot be rejected 19.
Finally, we identify the budget asked equation by assuming that the cost
of writing a proposal is linear in . Identiﬁcation through functional
form is clearly not very attractive. However, it is difﬁcult to conceive
of observable variables that would affect outcomes such as selection and
publication output but would not affect budget requested. Indeed, although
our exclusion restrictions are very plausible, our sample is small and our
18. As discussed earlier, DPRO7 is also excluded. However, this exclusion is not critical for
identiﬁcation but for preserving degrees of freedom.
19. The value of the chi-square statistic is 2.98 with two degrees of freedom, so that the exclusion
restriction we impose cannot be rejected.
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restrictions and functional form. Accordingly, for each estimated equation
(except the selection equation) we tested for robustness by estimating a
linear speciﬁcation as well. The results do not change much, although
the log-log speciﬁcation ﬁts the data somewhat better. Table A1 in the
appendix shows the reduced form estimates using levels. By comparing
them to Table 3 and 4, one can see that the log speciﬁcation is a better
ﬁt, but that the qualitative properties of the empirical model are not driven
by the speciﬁcation.
5.2. Results: Selection, Budget Asked, Budget Granted
Table 5 shows the results of the probit estimates. Note that the selection
estimates strongly support the notion that selecton is driven by the objectives
of the programme. These objectives in turn do not appear to be substantively
different from those of comparable public research programmes in the US.
Thus, variables correlated with scientiﬁc merit (K, COLLAB) are quanti-
tatively and statistically signiﬁcant. Likewise, “industrial transferability”
increases the probability of selection. Interestingly enough, units from the
South of Italy do not appear to be particularly advantaged, even though
TABLE 5
Selection_Equation (PROBIT).
























(of which positive) (347)
Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parenthesis.
184providing such a preference is an explicit announced aim in many CNR
programmes.
Table 6 reports the results of joint-estimation of (7) and (8). Note that the
estimates are similar to the reduced form estimates. Larger research groups
have lower marginal costs in applying for grants ( ), but they gain no
advantage from being part of larger institutions ( ) or from being in more
populated areas ( ). Externalities amongst research groups in the same
institution or in the same city are not pronounced. CNR acts consistently
and puts no weight on NUIST or PROV_POP in the funding decision (
and ). Instrument development projects are more expensive to set up
( ), and CNR grants them a larger fraction of budget ( ). Transferability
and past publications increase the fraction of the budget granted ( and
). CNR units also obtain a larger fraction of expected budget ( ).
Unobserved characteristics of the units matter as well, although the statistical
signiﬁcance of is not high. The estimated value of suggests that non
research (indirect) costs are of the order of 32% of the expected budget
conditional upon selection. The coefﬁcients of DSOUTH, and , are
TABLE 6
GLS Estimation of Budget Requested and Budget Granted equations
(Equations (7) and (8)).
Dependent variables: ln( A) and ln( G). No of obs. .
Log of likelihood function .
Parameters Estimates Parameters Estimates
Const 0 –0.051 Const 0 1.769
(0.887) (1.252)
DCNR CNR –0.210 DCNR CNR 0.322
(0.115) (0.146)
DUNI UNI –0.004 DUNI UNI 0.097
(0.116) (0.132)
DSOUTH S 0.358 DSOUTH S –0.185
(0.103) (0.088)
DPRO7 7 –0.272 DPRO7 7 0.369
(0.156) (0.125)
TRANSF T 0.014 TRANSF T 0.130
(0.073) (0.107)
ln K 0.013 ln K 0.136
(0.038) (0.107)
ln(COLLAB) C 0.076 ln(COLLAB) C 0.049
(0.053) (0.078)
ln(NUIST) U 0.023 ln(NUIST) U –0.026
(0.045) (0.041)
ln(PROV_POP) P –0.033 ln(PROV_POP) P 0.065
(0.052) (0.061)
ln(AGEPI) A 0.126 LN(AGEPI) A –0.115
(0.218) (0.191)




Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parenthesis.
REPUTATION AND COMPETENCE IN PUBLICLY FUNDED SCIENCE 185respectively 0.36 and –0.19, and they are well measured. These estimates
clarify the reasons for the pattern revealed by the reduced form estimates in
Table 3. However, the positive sign of suggests that units in the South
prepare larger projects for one reason. All else constant, they have a lower
cost of writing larger grants.
5.3. Results: Production Function of Publications
We experimented with different speciﬁcations for in estimating (9).
In the end, we settled on a logistic speciﬁcation, , where
and are parameters to be estimated. The logistic ﬁt the data better
than either a constant elasticity , or a linear speciﬁcation with
interaction, . In each case, the point estimates
of the elasticity are almost the same as those reported here 20. The logistic
speciﬁcation also has the appealing property that it allows the elasticity to
vary but within bounds, namely that with , is an upper bound
of the elasticity of budget.
For the logistic speciﬁcation reported in Table 7, the estimated value of
of 1.01 implies that the elasticity of research budgets has an upper bound
of about 1. More interestingly, the statistical signiﬁcance of indicates
that the elasticity of research budget does increase with the stock of past
publications of the 21. In turn, this means that the distribution of
the elasticity of research budgets ought to mimic the skewed distribution of
past performance. Indeed, as Figure 4 shows, the distribution of our logistic
evaluated at the estimated parameters, and , is skewed towards
the left. Although the estimated for our sample ranges between 0.51
and 1.01, its value at the median of the population of 347 selected units
is 0.58. Moreover, about 90% of these units have an output elasticity with
respect to research budget that lies in the range below 0.8 22.
This estimated elasticity is consistent with a characterisation of the
scientiﬁc enterprise as a “star” system. While the productivity of the
large majority of our research groups falls within a limited range around
the median of the distribution, a small fraction of the research groups
displays higher productivities. The skewed distribution of suggests
that the marginal product of total budget in a given research programme may
vary substantially with changes in the resource allocations among research
units. Thus, as we show in the next section, changes in resource allocation
schemes can change aggregate output.
20. Table A2 in the appendix reports our estimated production function of publications using the
constant and log-linear elasticities.
21. Note that estimate of is statistically signiﬁcant even though appears as a separate
regressor.
22. We also estimated (9) by using the actual levels of research budgets instead of instrumenting
for it. This amounted to using actual values of instead of the expression for ￿
e in (9).
We found that in this case 0 is 0.67 and is 0.007, and they are both statistically signiﬁcant.
Our model then predicts higher elasticities of research budget (and a distribution with greater
spread) than if one did not instrument for research grants.
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Publication Equation – Logistic (Equation (9) – TOBIT).






























Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parenthesis.
As far as the other parameters of the production function are concerned,
Table 7 shows that bio-instrumentation projects and southern units have
lower output (DPRO7 and DSOUTH), whereas collaborations with foreign
institutions increases output (COLLAB). Consistent with our identifying
assumptions, the size of the team does not affect productivity. To the
extent that SIZE proxies for other resources available to the units, this
effect manifests itself largely through the size of the project, budget asked,
rather than directly affecting research output. This results is also consistent
with our earlier assumption that these are “small” projects. We also found
that externalities within the same institution or from being part of large
metropolitan areas do not play a signiﬁcant role (NUIST and PROV_POP).
It was noted, at the end of Section 4.1, that the marginal product of the
budgetary resources provided by comparatively small grants from the CNR
would tend to be raised when the research unit in question was able to
maintain more “infrastructure” by spreading its costs over projects funded
from other sources. It should be clear that SIZE alone would not serve
as a proxy for the capacity to obtain the margins of funding above direct
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research costs that would be required for such purposes; the same factors that
affect the probability of receiving a grant, and the magnitude of the project
budget, would most likely be just as relevant in obtaining funding from other
sources. Among those factors we have found the “knowledge capital” of
the unit, , to be signiﬁcant in the case of the CNR project. By symmetry,
this would imply that some part of the estimated direct effect of on
the unit’s productivity in using CNR programme-provided resources may,
in some part, be reﬂecting the positive role of past research performance
in furnishing the unit with a better physical and human “infrastructure”.
Of course, without the necessary data on other sources of research support
held by the units, this must remain a conjectural interpretation and the
hypothesised “infrastructure effect” of the unit’s accumulated knowledge
capital cannot be identiﬁed separately within the direct production effect
of .
Finally, although their statistical signiﬁcance is not high, the point
estimates of TRANSF and AGEPI are negative and large in magnitude.
The negative impact of the age of the PI may reﬂect not just life cycle
effects, but also selection effects at the tails of the age distribution. More
188reputed and productive researchers are likely to become PIs at younger ages.
Thus, compared with the median age, at lower ages, the expected quality
of PIs is likely to be higher. No further interpretation can be given to
this coefﬁcient in a cross section data set such as ours. The point estimate
coefﬁcient of TRANSF suggests that, other things being equal, there is a
trade-off between industrial transferability and publications: projects aimed
at industrial applications produce about 20% fewer publications.
6 Optimal Resource Allocation and
Returns to Past Performance
6.1. Optimal Allocation of Resources and the Aggre-
gate Productivity of Research Budgets
As has already been noticed, the skewed distribution of suggests
that the average productivity of research budgets at the aggregate level may
vary considerably with the distribution of research grant allocations, even
when the total size of the research budget does not change. Given our esti-
mated parameters, in this section we ask which allocation of resources would
equalise the selected units’ respective marginal productivities–reckoned in
terms of expected quality adjusted-publications 23.
It should be understood at the outset that this is a very short-run allocative
criterion, and that qualiﬁcation must be borne in mind when interpreting
our references to the magnitude of the actual CNR allocations’ departure
from “optimality”. Maximising conditional expected aggregate output in this
way would not take into consideration the effects upon the research units’
subsequent capabilities, their future access to funding (from all sources)
and the expected future trajectory of their productivity. Nor does it allow
for generalised training effects, and possible long-run spillovers that depend
upon the presence of groups pursuing a diversity of approaches, including
approaches that have yet to show payoffs in terms of past publication
performance measures. It is by no means obvious that the dynamic effects
would run in the same direction as the ﬁrst round consequences of a
reallocation that equalised marginal (expected) outputs across the population
of funded units; shifting funding towards the presently most productive units
might have deleterious effects upon the development of others whose future
productivity potential is far higher–even were it to be suitably discounted.
Nevertheless, obtaining a sense of the magnitude of the short-run reallocation
effects remains an important starting point in any attempt at a more complete
dynamic analysis.
23. We perform this experiment only for the units that were funded by the CNR. This amounts
to taking the actual selection decision of CNR as given, and looking for the allocation of
resources that maximise the expected total publications of the programme.
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an estimate of their marginal product of publications, . Since
, one can use the following expression
as an estimate of the marginal product of budget
(10)
where
Note that the marginal product of publications depends on all
characteristics of the units, not simply and . Hence, even though
increases in , the marginal product need not.
We proceed by ranking our selected units according to , and comparing
the units located at the mid point of each quartile. The total budget received
by those units was then reallocated so that their estimated marginal products
were equalised. Table 8 shows that to maximise aggregate publications in
this way, 85% of total budget should be allocated to the top quartile. In the
resulting, short-run “re-optimised” allocation, a very large share of the total
available budget would be given to a small percentage of highly productive
teams. Also, as shown by Table 8, the efﬁcient allocation to the top unit
is roughly of the same magnitude of the amount of budget asked by that
unit (496 vs. 477 million Lire). These “optimal” short-run allocations are
thus of reasonable size, and do not entail grant awards in excess of the
(self-assessed) “absorptive capacities” of the units 24.
We also compared the output produced by the “re-optimized” allocation
with the benchmark case of equal allocations. Given the total budget
actually allocated to our four units, Table 8 reports what their expected
total publications would have been, had they obtained identical shares of
that those funds. Rather surprisingly, it turns out that this “egalitarian”
distribution of funding would yield the same expected publications output
as that obtained with the actual CNR allocations; in effect it “remedies”
the disproportionately large budget that was allocated to a relatively low
marginal product unit. But, from Table 8 one may also see that the
“re-optimized” allocation produces about 19% more total publications (in
quality-adjusted units) than both the actual and “egalitarian” allocations.
Needless to say, the foregoing calculations are intended merely to illustrate
what our econometric results imply, and are not presented in support
of any policy prescriptions. As the introductory caveats in this section
have indicated, maximising the existing research community’s output of
publications is unlikely to be the sole objective of a sensible national science
24. We experimented with many different observations around the mid-point of each quartile, and
the results discussed here are robust.
190policy 25. What our analysis shows is that by making use of data generated
in the management of the public funding process, it is possible to quantify
the trade-off between various goals in terms of foregone production of
scientiﬁc publications.
6.2. Total Returns to Past Performance
Our second experiment is to compute the total returns to past performance
. As discussed in the introduction, the indirect effect of past performance
through budget can amplify differences in scientiﬁc productivity. The
magnitude of this effect may then be suggestive of the extent to which
the observed skewed distribution of publications in the scientiﬁc enterprise
is inﬂuenced by the institutional mechanisms of resource allocation in this
sector.
The elasticity of output with respect to past performance is
(11)
where is the elasticity of in the selection equation, and
. Since we do not observe (because we do not
observe ), and we do not observe and , we cannot compute
directly. However, we can estimate it by taking the expectation of (11)
over , , and , given . Using to denote the expected value
of the budget conditional upon selection (but not upon ), the estimated
elasticity is
(11a)
In (11a), the ﬁrst term measures the direct effect of past performance given
the budget, the second term measure the indirect effect through increases in
25. One can list a number of reasons. Papers produced by different PIs, even though of the
same quality, may not be perfect substitutes. One may wish to encourage certain ﬁelds rather
than others. In our particular programme we saw that the agency also wanted to encourage
industrial transferability of scientiﬁc research, and our estimates of the production function of
publications suggest that industrial transferability has a negative impact on publication output.
Second, one may wish to have a diversiﬁed portfolio to minimize risk. Third, one may wish
to encourage young talent, even at the cost of a short run reduction in output. This could be
either if there is learning-by-doing in research, or if by funding young scientists, the public
agency can get a signal about their true productivity, and hence, can make more informed
funding decisions in the future. (See for instance ARORA and GAMBARDELLA [1997].)
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Effects of Alternative Reallocations of Research Budget Resources (347 selected units ranked by past publications K, mid-points
of each quartile: positions 43, 130, 207, 304).
Marginal Actual Efﬁcient Marginal Expected Expected# Equal Expected Past Budget
product allocation allocation product #pubs. pubs. Using share #pubs. publ. asked
(*) G
0
G of efﬁcient using efﬁcient allocation using ^
A








0.109 0.677 156 496 0.0875 29.3 64.2 145.75 28.0 74.0 477
0.006 0.604 100 23.5 0.0875 8.2 3.4 145.75 10.3 41.0 620
0.189 0.561 120 38.5 0.0875 11.4 6.0 145.75 12.7 22.8 126.2
0.049 0.531 207 25 0.0875 12.6 4.1 145.75 10.5 10.3 562
Total: 583 Total: 583 Total: 61.5 Total: 77.7 Total: 583 Total: 61.5
(*) Computed as G using actual values of PUB and G and estimated , logistic.




2probability of selection (given expected budget conditional upon selection)
and the third term measures the indirect effect through the increase in
expected budget conditional upon selection.
Figure 5a shows the distribution of for our sample of selected units.
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics of , and of its three components.
The average value of the total elasticity of publication output with respect
to past publication performance is 0.64. This value is determined largely
by the direct effect , whose sample mean is 0.27, and the indirect effect
through selection , whose sample average is 0.31. The indirect effect
through budget given selection, , is smaller; its average value in the
sample is 0.07.
TABLE 9
Descriptive Statistics for Elasticity with Respect to Past Performance
(347 observations for ).
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
k1 (direct effect) 0.272 0.223 0.011 0.993
k2 (indirect effect selecton) 0.305 0.096 0.067 0.549
k3 (indirect effect budget) 0.066 0.030 0.011 0.161
k (total effect) 0.643 0.304 0.109 1.466
This suggests that there are important reinforcing effects of past
performance in the scientiﬁc sector, operating primarily by increasing the
chances of selection. The relative insensitivity of the expected budget
conditional upon selection may reﬂect a measurement issue–it is difﬁcult
to ﬁnd variables that affect the budget conditional upon selection, but not
selection itself. Even so, we believe that our results point to the importance
of the selection process, where reputation and quality of the research unit
appear to play a very prominent role.
Although our cross-sectional data do not allow us to take dynamic
considerations into account, the indirect effects seem to be serious enough
to be capable of generating increasing returns to past performance. Consider
the following suggestive piece of evidence: the total elasticity of publication
output with respect to past publications in our sample is greater than
unity for 47 of the 347 selected units, and, as shown by Figure 5b, these
values are associated with higher . Since the estimated direct effect is
well below one, the institutional mechanisms for resource allocation in the
scientiﬁc enterprise may be critical in creating the appearance of increasing
research returns to the accumulation of knowledge capital at the level of
the individual research unit. The marked skewness in the distribution of
publication outputs of individual scientists, and of research groups, thus
may be due in large part to the way in which academic-style scientiﬁc
activities are funded. In turn, this points to the importance of controlling for
funding levels and for selection in estimating the “competences” of research
organizations and the research “abilities” of individual scientists. Failure to
do so will produce greatly exaggerated estimates of the dispersion in the
underlying distribution of innate research capabilities.
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Distribution of Rho(K), and plot on past publ.
(347 observations for I=1).
a) Distribution of Rho(K).
b) Plot of Rho(K) on past publications.
1947 Conclusions
Empirical studies of resource allocation in the Republic of Science are still
in their infancy. While economists have ignored it, quantitative sociologists
of science have largely been concerned with the determinants of the scientiﬁc
productivity of individuals and their career paths. In the natural sciences and
engineering, research is increasingly a group activity, one whose continuity
depends upon success in mobilizing not just human resources but costly
instruments, materials, and facilities as well.
This paper has examined the determinants of the publication performance
of publicly funded scientiﬁc research groups. We modeled the process
of resource allocation and production of scientiﬁc research output. Our
analysis allows for unobserved differences across research units and corrects
for “funding selection biases”, which have been found to be quantitatively
quite important.
We estimate that for a large fraction of the research groups in our sample
the elasticity of quality-adjusted publications with respect to the budget
given is about 0.6. However, for a small fraction of researchers, with high
values of quality-adjusted past publications, this elasticity is higher, and it
approaches unity. This implies that the aggregate publication output may
vary with the distribution of research grants.
This relatively high responsiveness of output to research budgets points to
an important indirect route through which past performance inﬂuences future
performance. Superior performance on the part of the group’s leader in the
past increase the probability of the research proposal being selected. This
indirect effect turned out to be substantial. While the combined elasticity of
publication output with respect to past publications is on average 0.64, the
indirect component accounts for almost 60% of this ﬁgure. Moreover, the
elasticity varies across research units; for a small fraction of our applicant
units, it is greater than 1.
The nature of the analysis carried out here is not normative, either in
its intent or its conclusions. We most certainly would not advance it as
suggesting that the institutional mechanisms for funding scientiﬁc research
are inefﬁcient, or that using past performance to estimate productivity
is incorrect. Neither do we claim that the characteristic skewness of
the distribution of scientiﬁc publications is socially undesirable. Absent
systematic micro-level time series data on inputs (funding levels), and
research performance in various scientiﬁc ﬁelds, questions of that kind
simply cannot be answered. Our objective in this paper has been to
demonstrate the possibilities of quantitatively describing the relationships
that proximately govern productivity in scientiﬁc research groups. In doing
so, we have made a start towards fully uncovering how competence (both
innate and acquired), reputation, and the institutional mechanisms for
the funding of academic research interact in the production of scientiﬁc
knowledge.
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Results for Alternate Speciﬁcations
TABLE A1
Reduced Form Equations: OLS Budget Granted and Publication
G G PUB PUB PUB
Const 9.90 93.14 –0.14 15.42 –0.80
(14.66) (21.33) (3.56) (7.50) (3.32)
DPRO7 27.39 54.79 –1.47 –6.21 –3.37
(10.17) (16.54) (0.80) (1.54) (1.01)
DCNR 30.55 26.18 –1.32 –3.84 –3.34
(10.90) (13.44) (1.42) (2.94) (1.39)
DUNI 9.72 –2.16 0.18 –0.68 –0.46
(5.717) (10.34) (1.44) (3.52) (1.33)
DSOUTH –0.20 –8.70 –2.65 –6.64 –2.64
(5.65) (8.96) (0.90) (1.87) (0.87)
TRANSF 17.15 6.12 0.58 –0.46 –0.55
(4.65) (6.30) (0.97) (1.74) (0.93)
SIZE 1.32 1.07 0.05 0.00 –0.03
(0.34) (0.40) (0.07) (0..09) (0.06)
0.32 0.08 0.23 0.25 0.21
(0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
COLLAB 4.38 1.27 0.70 0.66 0.41
(1.32) (1.43) (0.29) (0.42) (0.28)
NUIST 0.01 0.35 –0.06 –0.09 –0.06
(0.18) (0.28) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03)
PROV_POP* 4.29 –0.86 0.55 0.06 0.25
(2.45) (4.21) (0.44) (0.95) (0.41)
AGEPI –0.46 –0.49 0.00 –0.12 0.03
(0.26) (0.40) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05)
G 0.07
(0.01)
No of obs 797 347 797 347 7.97
Adj. 2 0.14 0.13 0.35 0.42 0.42
(*) Measured in hundreds of thousands.
Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parenthesis.
196TABLE A2
Publication equation – Constant and logarithmic speciﬁcation
(TOBIT).








DPRO7 7 –1.014 –0.812
(0.482) (0.583)
DSOUTH S –0.504 –0.578
(0.234) (0.257)
TRANSF T –0.047 –0.120
(0.182) (0.204)




ln(COLLAB) C 0.301 0.266
(0.131) (0.143)
ln(NUIST) U –0.002 –0.014
(0.062) (0.064)
ln(PROV_POP) P –0.029 –0.049
(0.099) (0.105)




Log of Likelihood –520.11 –519.81
Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parenthesis.
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